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7.1 Introduction
A prominent strand of international macroeconomics literature has re-
cently devoted considerable attention to what has been dubbed “sudden
stops”; that is, sharp reversals in aggregate foreign capital inﬂows. While
there seems to be insuﬃcient consensus on what triggers such reversals,
two consequences have been amply documented—namely, exchange rate
drops and downturns in economic activity, eﬀectively constricting domes-
tic consumption smoothing. This literature also notes, however, that not all
countries respond similarly to sudden stops: whereas ensuing devaluations
and output contractions are often dramatic among emerging markets, ﬁ-
nancially advanced countries tend to be far more impervious to those dis-
ruptive eﬀects.1
These stylized facts about sudden stops have been based entirely on
post-1970 evidence. Yet, periodical sharp reversals in international capital
ﬂows are not new phenomena. Leaving aside the period between the 1930s
Depression and the breakdown of the Bretton-Woods system in 1971
(when stringent controls on cross-border capital ﬂows prevailed around
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1. Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejia (2004) note, for instance, that whereas 63 percent of sudden
stop episodes have been associated with devaluations in emerging markets, the proportion
drops to 17 percent among advanced economies.the globe), a large body of the historical literature has highlighted the fact
that the pace of international capital ﬂows has been anything but smooth
(Eldstein 1982; Stone 1999; DeLong 1999; Eichengreen 2003). In particu-
lar, past ﬁnancial crises in emerging economies have been shown to be
frequently associated with dramatic downturns in capital ﬂows that often
seemed hard to rationalize (Kindleberger 1978). Partly because of data
limitations, however, cross-country evidence on historical patterns of sud-
den stops and their relationship to exchange rate developments has been
unsystematic at best.
This paper aims to ﬁll some of this gap. First, it describes the historical
evidence on sudden stops (SS henceforth) using a new international data
set on capital inﬂows spanning sixteen countries since the early days of
ﬁnancial globalization, around 1870—when asset market arbitrage was
greatly spurred by the advent of the transatlantic telegraph in 1866—
through the eve of World War I. Two key features that underpin the current
relevance of this period are the high degree of world capital market inte-
gration and the widespread use of bond ﬁnancing as the main instrument
of sovereign borrowing—two clear similarities with its late twentieth-
century/early twenty-ﬁrst century counterpart.2
Four sets of questions are then asked about the nature of SSs, namely:
• Are SSs an exclusive feature of a class of countries, or do they hit cap-
ital-importing economies more generally, irrespective of their level of
development and monetary regimes?
• How large are such SSs relative to the size of the recipient country’s
economy, and what is their average duration?
• Do SSs display some systematic cross-country pattern and time
bunch, or is there evidence that they are typically triggered by idio-
syncratic country shocks?
• Is there a systematic relationship between SSs and shifts in monetary
policy and interest rates in major capital-exporting countries?
Against this background, the second contribution of the paper is to es-
tablish the links (if any) between SSs and currency crashes. A feature of the
pre-World War I period, which makes it especially interesting for looking
at this relationship, is the existence of an international monetary system
that provided one key incentive for countries to peg their currencies to gold
and thus forestall devaluations or depreciations. Bordo and Rockoﬀ(1996)
and Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) argue that membership of the “gold club”
tended to shave oﬀbetween 40 to 60 basis points in countries’ spreads. This
represented nonnegligible savings to sovereign borrowers, given the gener-
ally high ratios of countries’ foreign-currency-denominated debts to GDP
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2. See Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) for measures of international capital integration over the
past century and a half.at the time, and the much narrower dispersion of country spreads rela-
tive to today (Mauro, Sussman, and Yafeh 2002). In this late nineteenth/
early twentieth-century setting, a currency drop following an SS would thus
tend to be starkingly revealing about other costs of keeping the peg. As dis-
cussed subsequently, these costs include the need of accumulating large
gold reserves yielding low returns (relative to other domestic investment
opportunities) as well as forgoing the role of the exchange rate as a shock
absorber. Further, decisions to abandon the peg or not to join gold may
also be revealing of the existence of institutional frictions that mitigated
the political cost of currency crises in some countries relative to others.3
To shed light on this relationship between SSs and currency drops, a cen-
tral ingredient of the analysis is consideration given to the various factors
that drive exchange rate behavior. Based on a simple model of nominal ex-
change rate determination and using probit panel regressions, the paper
looks at what distinguishes successful peggers to those that experienced
currency crashes. As will be seen, this approach helps discern country-
speciﬁc from common international factors driving the relationship be-
tween SSs and currency drops.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 7.2 docu-
ments SS patterns across the sixteen countries comprising the study. Sec-
tion 7.3 looks at the distinct exchange rate responses to capital account
shocks in the context of a simple exchange rate model and probit regres-
sions. Section 7.4 zooms in on country-speciﬁc monetary and ﬁscal stances
as well as ﬁnancial structures that may account for the diﬀerent outcomes
to common international shocks. Section 7.5 concludes with a summary of
the main ﬁndings and a discussion of some salient implications.
7.2 Patterns of Sudden Stops
A ﬁrst issue in the deﬁnition of an SS is whether capital inﬂows are mea-
sured in net or gross terms. The recent literature overwhelmingly uses the
net concept—the capital or ﬁnancial account balance—for which data is
available at higher (usually quarterly) frequencies.4 However, this choice is
not inconsequential. For instance, straightforward balance of payments
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3. For instance, if interest groups linked to export sectors have a higher leverage on do-
mestic policymaking in some of these countries, this would tend to mitigate such political
costs and foster the politics of a weaker currency, delaying or even thwarting eﬀorts to join or
rejoin gold. There is considerable controversy in the literature, however, on whether such ex-
port lobbies systematically succeeded in shaping currency policies in the various countries
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. See, for instance, Fritsch (1988) on
the case of Brazil. Using a broader cross-country sample, Meissner (2005) ﬁnds no signiﬁcant
econometric evidence that inﬂationist agricultural interests played a signiﬁcant role in the
timing of gold pegs.
4. See, e.g., Dornbush, Goldfajn, and Valdez (1995), Edwards (2004), and Calvo, Izquierdo
and Mejia (2004). One study that considers both gross and net ﬂow variables is Caballero,
Cowan, and Kearns (2004).(BOP) accounting indicates that an exogenous improvement in a country’s
net barter terms of trade automatically translates in a drop in net capital
inﬂows, all else being constant. In an economic sense, this is very diﬀerent
from a situation in which the country faces a sudden drop in the supply of
external ﬁnancing, to which the current account has to improve (unless the
country possesses suﬃcient international reserves to smoothe the capital
account shock) through a devaluation or a contraction of income. In prin-
ciple, the concept of sudden stops should refer to the latter and not to the
former type of event.
In what follows, lack of data on total gross inﬂows for every country re-
quires a somewhat eclectic approach. Speciﬁcally, I combine a measure of net
capital inﬂows to countries for which the series is available, with information
collected by Stone (1999) on gross portfolio calls on the London market.
Since Britain was then by far the largest capital-exporting nation (in terms of
both absolute annual ﬂows and ratios to GNP) and the most important lend-
ing center for the overwhelming majority of emerging markets, one would ex-
pect such a portfolio call measure to closely trace ﬂuctuations in gross ﬂows
to most countries. As shown below, information about SS patterns derived
from these diﬀerent sources yields a broadly consistent story.
Figure 7.1 plots net capital ﬂows into capital importing countries for
which data is available.5As expected from countries with very diﬀerent com-
modity specializations and under distinct policy regimes, there is clearly
some diversity in the time pattern of capital inﬂows. Yet, what is arguably
much more striking about ﬁgure 7.1 is the apparent synchronicity of the
downswings across most countries. Three main episodes stand out in par-
ticular: the downswing of 1874–80, that of the early 1890s, and the shorter
downturn of 1906–08. Clearly, not all countries were equally aﬀected and,
in a couple of occasions, foreign capital ﬂows moved in opposite directions
in a subset of them (e.g., Norway and Russia in the early 1890s). But over-
all, such downswings hit the overwhelming majority of countries at about
the same time and were often abrupt. This suggests that pre-WWI SSs did
display some time bunching similar to that observed over the past decade
and a half (Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejia 2004).
As discussed further, it is also striking that SSs hit countries with
widely disparate per capita income levels and distinct monetary regimes.
They struck countries as poor as Brazil (with an estimated per capita
GDP of US$811 in 1913 on constant 1990 purchasing power parity [PPP]
basis) and as rich as the United States (with a per capital GDP of
US$5,301 on the same PPP basis in 1913).6 Some of them remained on
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5. Net capital import data are not available for Greece and Portugal throughout the period,
or for Argentina and Russia before the 1880s and Brazil after 1900. See appendix 2 for infor-
mation on the respective data sources.
6. International data on per capita GDP on a constant PPP basis since 1870 is available in
Maddison (2003).gold throughout, such as Scandinavia and North America since the late
1870s, whereas others experimented with distinct monetary regimes such
as bimetallism, temporary gold-pegs, and plain inconvertible paper
money; none of these regimes could prevent a capital importer from be-
ing hit by an SS.7
These inferences are broadly corroborated by available data on gross
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Fig. 7.1 Net foreign capital inﬂows (million pounds)
Source: See appendix B.
7. It may well be that more ﬂexible exchange rates helped insulate domestic output from the
SS, as argued in Edwards (2004) based on post-1970 evidence. A comparison between output
responses to SSs across the diﬀerent exchange rate regimes in the prewar era is not discussed
here, however, and constitutes an interesting topic for future research.ﬂows based on portfolio calls on the London market. While the latter seem
to account for a smaller share of total gross foreign investment in southern
Europe and Russia—where French and German capital ﬂows were promi-
nent—bond ﬂotations in London were by far the most important external
ﬁnancing instrument to capital-importing countries in Latin America and
the Anglo-Saxon New World. Starting with Argentina, this gross inﬂow in-
dicator portrays a very similar pattern as that of the net inﬂow data, both
highlighting the major SS of 1889–1994, which was closely associated with
a famed ﬁnancial crisis that brought down the Baring’s investment bank
(see della Paolera and Taylor 2001 for a detailed account). Similarly, sharp
downturns in gross portfolio inﬂows around the same period are also ob-
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Fig. 7.1 (cont.)served for Brazil and Chile which, in addition, experienced another SS ear-
lier in the 1870s and later in the 1890s—in the Brazilian case leading to a
sovereign debt rescheduling in 1898 and in the Chilean case in an aban-
donment of the gold peg.8 With regard to southern Europe, and bearing in
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8. For further speciﬁcs, see Franco (1990) and Llona Rodriguez (2000).
Fig. 7.2 Gross portfolio calls on London (million pounds)
Source: Stone (1999).mind the above-mentioned caveat about the limitations of gross ﬂow data
for these countries, ﬁgure 7.2 also ﬂeshes out a similar timing of SSs in
much of southern Europe.9
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Fig. 7.2 (cont.)
9. In the case of Russia, discrepancies in the timing of the SSs between the gross and the net
capital inﬂow series plotted in ﬁgure 7.1 suggest that capital ﬂows into Russia other than those
associated with London ﬂoatations were important and may have dominated in the aggre-
gate. Another possibility is that, since the net capital ﬂow series was derived from the diﬀer-
ence between the current account balance and changes in international reserves, it may reﬂect
large inaccuracies in the measurement of these two variables. See appendix 2.Turning to the Anglo-Saxon capital importers, the gross capital inﬂows
indicator further highlights the fact that these countries also experienced
SSs, despite operating a more rules-based monetary regime, displaying
greater ﬁscal discipline overall and remaining pegged to gold throughout.10
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10. The United States formally adopted the gold standard in 1879 but policy actions and
statements, as well as a gradual appreciation of the currency under way since the mid-1870s
toward the antebellum parity, signaled to market participants that gold resumption was im-
minent.
Fig. 7.2 (cont.)Table 7.1 The chronology of sudden stops and currency drops
Sudden stops




Brazil 1876–1880 1875–1879 1876–1880
1888–1894 1888–1894 1890–1898






















Australia 1890–1894 1886–1893 None
1898–1899 1895–1899 None
1903–1907 None















United States 1872–1878 1872–1877 None
1887–1994 1890–1894 None
1907–1908 1905–1906 None
1910–1913 NoneSimilar considerations apply to all four Scandinavian countries (Denmark,
Finland, Norway, and Sweden).11
Further corroboration of the evidence that SSs usually bunch over time
is provided in the more formal classiﬁcation of these episodes, reported in
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Fig. 7.3 Frequency distribution of sudden stops
Source: See appendix A.
11. Fiscal discipline was especially remarkable among Scandinavian countries where
public debt averaged between 15 to 20 percent of GDP during 1870–1913. On this front, Scan-
dinavian countries were only superseded by the United States, for which the public debt to
GDP ratio averaged 9 percent and fell to a low around 3 percent by the eve of World War I.
This contrasts with much higher period averages for countries such as Argentina, Chile,
Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. The implications of these diﬀerences in ﬁscal perfor-
mances are examined later.table 7.1. Although ﬁgures 7.1 and 7.2 make reasonably clear what epi-
sodes should qualify as SSs, table 7.1 summarizes this information, using
the following working deﬁnition: an SS is deﬁned as a drop (from peak
to trough) of no less than two standard deviations of the deviations of re-
spective series from a linear trend, and/or any drop that exceeds 3 percent
of GDP over a period shorter than four years. Timing the beginning of SS
as the year where capital inﬂows (measured in million pounds) peak, then
SS is then said to end in the year when capital ﬂows start rising relative to
trend without falling back to its lowest level (also relative to trend) within
a four-year window. On this basis, it is clear that both the net and the gross
ﬂow data yield a broadly similar picture about the timing of SSs in most
countries.
Using the same deﬁnition, ﬁgure 7.3 plots the incidence of SSs over
time, normalized by total SS observations in the sample. Both the net and
gross measures clearly indicate that SSs bunched around the mid-1870s,
the early 1890s, in 1906–1907, and also, albeit to a lesser extent, in the late
1890s, according to the net ﬂow measure. Such a pattern is consistent with
that of the net capital outﬂow series from Britain, France, and Ger-
many—the three main capital exporting countries of the late nineteenth
century, which is plotted in the upper panel of ﬁgure 7.4. At the same time,
the lower panel of the same ﬁgure also show that allSSs were, in turn, pre-
ceded with a one or two year lag by a hike in core central banks’ discount
rate. This has striking parallels with the more contemporary evidence on
the adverse impact of advanced countries’ monetary tightening on capital
exports to emerging markets (Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart 1993; Fer-
nandez-Arias 1996), indicating that exogenous monetary shocks were key
drivers or “push factors” in capital ﬂow reversals during the prewar pe-
riod as well.
To further gauge the macroeconomic importance of SSs during the
period, ﬁgure 7.5 plots the usual metric of scaling net capital ﬂows by
GDP.12As one would expect in an era of free capital mobility and extensive
international borrowing, ﬁgure 7.5 shows that ﬂuctuations in net foreign
capital inﬂows (NFKIs) were sizeable. Absolute annual deviations from a
balanced capital account indicate that the macroeconomic impact was
largest in Argentina (where such deviations averaged 10 percent of GDP
over the entire period), then followed by Canada (7.5 percent of GDP),
Finland (6.25 percent of GDP), and Australia (5.5 percent). Pooling to-
gether all SS events in countries for which the respective NFKI series is
available, the peak-to-trough median drop in inﬂows amounted to 5.1 per-
cent of GDP. This is of a very similar magnitude as the trough-to-peak
magnitude of current account reversals identiﬁed by Calvo, Izquierdo, and
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12. It would be useful, as suggested by Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejia (2004), to use tradable
sector output as a scaling factor if such information were available.Mejia 2004, appendix table 3) in the more recent vintage of SSs (4.9 per-
cent). Further, as with its contemporary counterpart, pre-WWI SSs tended
to be persistent: measured in terms of mean or median, and regardless of
whether one uses the available gross or net capital inﬂow measures, the av-
erage duration of SSs is four years over the whole panel.
Also consistent with the prima facie evidence presented earlier, standard
tests on mean diﬀerences in the magnitude of SSs (again measured from
peak to trough) show no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between ﬁxers
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Fig. 7.4 Core countries: Net capital exports and interest rates (%)
Source: See appendix B.and ﬂoaters.13 No less interestingly, there is no statistically signiﬁcant
diﬀerence in the duration of SSs between the gold and nongold country
groups: SSs are reasonably persistent in both cases, with mean durations
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13. The mean for the ﬂoating (oﬀ-gold) group was 10.3 percent, whereas that for gold-
peggers was 5.6, but this large mean diﬀerence results from one large outlier—Argentina in
1890–92. Dropping the latter, the mean for the oﬀ-gold group falls to 5.1 percent. Partly be-
cause of that outlier intragroup standard errors are large, at 12 and 3 percent. Not surpris-
Fig. 7.5 Ratio of net capital inﬂows to GDP (%)
Source: See Appendix A.of 3.7 and 4.2 years, respectively, and again with no statistically signiﬁcant
diﬀerence in means.14 This evidence calls into question the view that ﬁxing
the exchange rate was a sine qua non condition for attracting and/or stabi-
lizing capital inﬂows. The fact that SSs also struck other gold-pegged coun-
tries with histories of sensible macropolicies suggests that neither the mon-
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Fig. 7.5 (cont.)
ingly in light of such high variance, the respective z-statistic for diﬀerences in mean is 0.99,
thus well below the 10 and 5 percent critical threshold levels of 1.64 and 1.96.
14. The respective z-statistic is 0.69. In computing this statistic, the duration of SSs in
Greece, Portugal, and New Zealand (countries for which a NFKI series is unavoidable), as
well as in Argentina and Russia prior to 1880, was measured using gross capital inﬂow series
as reported in table 7.1.etary regime nor the ﬁscal policy stance can insulate a country from a cap-
ital account shock, an evidence with striking parallels to that amassed by
Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejia (2004) who ﬁnd that neither diﬀerences in
monetary regimes nor country-speciﬁc ﬁscal behavior can explain the in-
cidence of SSs in their sample of 32 countries over 1990–2001.
7.3 Capital Flows and Currency Crashes
Despite the relatively rapid international spread of the gold standard
from the 1870s and the fact that all core industrial nations consistently
pegged their currencies to gold until the eve of World War I, many capital-
importing countries continued to operate distinct monetary regimes dur-
ing the period. In several cases what one observes is either a repeated
switch between a gold peg and a ﬂoating regime (for instance, in Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, and Greece),15 or countries that postponed gold standard
membership until a later stage, once substantial gold reserves were ac-
cumulated, facilitating uninterrupted adherence to the peg, as in India,
Japan, and Russia from 1897 (see Catão and Solomou 2005 for speciﬁcs).
Within this wide spectrum of country-speciﬁc monetary arrangements,
there were also those that never pegged to gold (China and Spain), one
(Portugal) that adopted gold much earlier (1856) but also left earlier
(1891), and countries such as Austria-Hungary and Italy, which were for-
mally oﬀ-gold during much of the period but saw their national monetary
authorities successfully shadowing the gold parity, which yielded relative
exchange rate stability as a result.
This diversity is apparent in the behavior of the various spot exchange
rates. While Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian currencies were kept within
the narrow gold points and thus were virtually ﬂat, ﬁgure 7.6 shows how
widely the price of the domestic currency relative to gold varied else-
where.16 Among Latin American economies, not only did exchange rates
display long-term depreciating trends, but they also witnessed large dis-
crete downward adjustments in the mid-to-late 1870s and between the late
1880s and early 1890s, which, in the case of Chile, was compounded a fur-
ther downward adjustment in 1906–1908. Several European countries un-
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15. Argentina stabilized its exchange rate and held on to a gold peg in 1870–75, 1883–84,
and 1899–1913. Brazil was on gold for a few months between 1888 and 1889 and from 1906
to 1913. Chile was on a bimetallic standard through 1879 and on gold between 1895 and 1898.
Greece was on gold in 1885 and then in 1910–13.
16. Since the British pound was then the main international currency that adhered to a
preestablished gold content throughout, all the nominal indices are measured relative to the
pound. To facilitate comparison, all series are rebased to 1900   100. Deﬁning the exchange
rate as the foreign price of domestic currency implies that a rise in the index corresponds to
an appreciation of the respective national currency relative to the pound. The experience of
countries that pegged their currencies to silver, such as Mexico, China, India and Japan, is not
reviewed here but is examined in Catão and Solomou (2005).der paper money regimes also witnessed nontrivial ﬂuctuations in the gold
parity of their currencies. Although relatively mild in Italy, sizeable depre-
ciations are observed in Russia in 1875–78, Greece in both 1884–86 and
1890–95, Spain in 1890–93 and 1895–98, and Portugal in 1891–94. Com-
paring the timing of these various exchange rate drops or currency crash
episodes with the timing of SSs in each countries reported in table 7.1, it is
clear that currency crashes were either concomitant with SSs or followed
the latter with a one- or two-year lag.
Three main questions then arise. First, to what extent are SSs driving
these exchange rates relative to other factors? Second, is the causality run-
ning from SS to exchange rates or from exchange rate risk (driven by, say,
Sudden Stops and Currency Drops: A Historical Look 259
Fig. 7.6 Nominal exchange rates in currency crisis countries (pound sterling/
domestic currency, 1900   100)contagion, or by factors that may be common to several countries, such as
primary commodity terms of trade) to SSs? Third, why did some large cap-
ital exporters who also faced SSs managed to stick to the peg when others
did not?
To shed light on these questions, one needs to consider the role of other
potential explanatory variables in explaining the exchange rate as well as
the possibility of reverse causality running from exchange rate changes to
SSs. A useful starting point is a model of exchange rate determination that
nests the various possible relationships—for instance, along the lines of
the monetary models of the 1970s and 1980s, which allow for short-run
price rigidity (see Frankel [1979] and Frankel and Rose [1995] for a syn-
thesis). Appendix 1 shows how these earlier models can be straightfor-
wardly extended to allow for a time-varying country risk premium—which
becomes a function of the supply of international liquidity—and for vio-
lations to long-run PPP; instead, the real equilibrium exchange is let to be
driven by terms of trade trends, long-run productivity diﬀerentials be-
tween home and abroad, and the country’s ﬁscal position—consistent with
a wide class of open-economy macromodels (see, for example, Edwards
1989, and Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ 1996 for surveys).
The formal derivation of the model laid out in appendix 1 yields the fol-
lowing reduced-form equation for expected parity deviations of the spot
exchange rate:
(1) E(et   e  t)    ( mt      yt)    (tot   t  o  t  )t 1    (y  pc   y  ∗
pc)t 1
       t 1   (it   it ∗)    ( b∗      res)t
where tot stands for the respective country’s net barter terms of trade; m is
domestic money supply, and y for domestic real output; ypc and y∗
pc stand
for domestic and foreign per capita GDP respectively, and i and i∗ for the
short-term domestic and foreign interest rates; g/t is the ratio of public ex-
penditure to revenues;17  b∗ stands for changes in the supply of foreign
capital ﬂows and  res for changes in the ratio of international reserves to
paper currency in circulation. All variables are expressed in natural loga-
rithms, with the bar subscript denoting the respective long-run or trend
equilibrium levels.
Recalling that the exchange rate is deﬁned here as the foreign price of the
domestic currency, equation (1) states that the expectation of a currency
drop will be higher as: (a) money supply grows relative to output; (b) terms
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17. The ratio of ﬁscal expenditure (G) to revenues (T ) is used instead of the more conven-
tional of scaling G– Tby GDP for two reasons. One is that it is always a nonnegative number,
which allows working with a log speciﬁcation. Second, it circumvents the problem of the well-













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.ative to foreign countries’ productivity; (d) the domestic interest rate drops
relative to its foreign counterpart; (e) the foreign supply of capital ﬂows
shifts down without the oﬀsetting of rising reserves relative to the currency
in circulation. It is straightforward to see in equation (1) that once the
terms 1/ (it – it ∗) and   res are shifted to the left-hand side, we have an in-
dex analogous to that of currency pressure popularized in the work of
Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996).18
On the basis of that model, table 7.2 reports probit estimates of the de-
terminants of a currency crash. In the absence of a commonly agreed-on
criterion in the literature,19 a currency crash is deﬁned here as an exchange
rate depreciation greater than at least one standard deviation of the annual
percentage change of the nominal exchange rate (relative to sterling) over
the entire 1870–1913 period, provided that this depreciation is not fully re-
versed within a three-year window. Thus deﬁned, our sample comprises
nineteen such events, which are listed in table 7.1.20As in Frankel and Rose
(1996) and many others, the dependent variable is set to one in the ﬁrst year
of a crisis episode and zero otherwise; the observations pertaining to the
period during which the crisis is ongoing (i.e., as the exchange continues to
slide) are dropped, since they are part of the same crisis already counted
once. Speciﬁcs on measurement and data sources are provided in appen-
dix 2.
The ﬁrst column of table 7.2 shows the estimates for the baseline model.
Nearly all variables yield the sign predicted by theory and most of them are
statistically signiﬁcant at 1 percent. The exceptions are the terms of trade
(TOT) gap (i.e., deviations of actual TOT from a log linear trend),21output
growth ( ln[Yreal]), and the interest rate diﬀerential (i– i∗). While the co-
eﬃcient on output growth yields the correct sign, the interest rate diﬀeren-
tial indicator (which enters the regression with a one-year lag to mitigate
endogeneity) actually yields the opposite sign as that predicted by the
model—not an uncommon result in many empirical estimates of the un-
covered interest parity condition (cf. Frankel and Rose 1995). Overall, the
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18. An advantage of the present formulation is that the weights of the interest rate diﬀer-
ential and the reserve terms can be econometrically determined through the estimation of 
1/  and  , rather than being imposed so as to equalize the respective unconditional variances
as in Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyzplosz (1996).
19. See Frankel and Rose (1996), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), and Milesi-Ferretti and
Razin (2000) for the diﬀerent classiﬁcation criteria employed in this literature. One feature of
the pre-1914 period which helps minimize disagreements on crisis dates is the more stable
price environment and the absence of policy devices such as crawling pegs, which make it
harder to separate currency crashes from noncrisis related discrete exchange rate adjustments
in response to high inﬂation bouts.
20. Due to lack of data on relevant covariates for Russia in the 1870s, the eﬀective number
of crisis events is reduced to eighteen in the probit estimation.
21. Throughout this paper, detrending is made on a linear or log-linear time trend given ev-
idence of trend stationarity from augmented Dickey-Fuller tests. These are available from the
author upon request.coeﬃcients show M2 growth to be a main determinant of currency crashes,
with a 1 percentage point increase in the former increasing the likelihood
of the latter by 3.4 percentage points. The other main drivers of currency
risk are the ratio of government expenditure to revenues, measured relative
to its log linear trend (G/T gap), and changes in the supply of foreign cap-
ital (World K ﬂows), and net of changes in the reserve-to-currency ratio
(“res/Mo”). The relative productivity diﬀerential is an additional signiﬁ-
cant predictor with the expected negative sign, though the estimated elas-
ticity is a lot lower. Overall, the model ﬁts the data reasonably well: a
pseudo R-squared of about 0.5 is high relative to that found in similar stud-
ies and, more importantly, the model correctly predicts some 98 percent of
events once a cutting-oﬀpoint for reﬁnancing a crash is of a predicted like-
lihood of greater than 50 percent. Employing a lower cut-oﬀ point of 20
percent reduces the prediction rate slightly, but even then the model cor-
rectly predicts 11 of the 18 crash events in the sample.
The two ensuing columns in table 7.2 ﬁne tune the previous results by
dropping the TOT (which had been statistically insigniﬁcant throughout),
and replacing the interest rate diﬀerential variable by the foreign interest
rate i∗, which is proxied by the Bank of England discount rate—the clos-
est proxy to a short-run, risk-free rate during the period. Consistent with
the prima facie evidence presented in section 7.2, higher foreign interest
rates in the year prior to the currency crash had a positive and signiﬁcant
impact on the crash at 10 percent. This corroborates the ﬁnding that mon-
etary tightening in the core is a signiﬁcant driver of currency pressures
in capital-importing countries. As also expected, given the evidence pre-
sented in section 7.2, the inclusion of i∗lowers the estimated coeﬃcients on
both the capital ﬂow and reserve variables. This is consistent with the re-
sults of Eichengreen (1992) who, using Granger-causality tests in a vector
auto-regressive (VAR) model of the U.K. economy, ﬁnds that changes in
the Bank of England discount rate Granger-caused capital exports. To the
extent that the two other core European central banks in France and Ger-
many tended to follow the Bank of England lead around cyclical turning
points—as illustrated in the bottom panel of ﬁgure 7.4 and also noted in
Lindert (1969)—the eﬀect of hikes in the U.K. discount rate on net capital
importing countries was thereby reinforced.
Finally, columns (5) to (8) check the robustness of the foregoing regres-
sions to the inclusion of three other potentially important variables. One is
the ratio of external public debt to exports—a usual yardstick of country
solvency in the sovereign debt literature. The respective estimate is statisti-
cally insigniﬁcant and has the opposite sign as that postulated by theory. A
similar ﬁnding obtains for the ratio of total public debt to GDP (column
[6]). The following column reports results for the inclusion of the ratio of
external to total public debt—an indicator of the extent of currency mis-
matches in countries’ balance sheets that is commonly associated with the
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inated in its own currency. This idea, much popularized by Eichengreen
and Hausman (1999) and further elaborated in many subsequent contri-
butions, suggests that the greater the mismatch the higher the risk of sov-
ereign defaults and currency crashes; so, one would expect the coeﬃcient
on this variable to be positively signed. Column (7) of table 7.2 shows that
while the respective point estimate is indeed positive it is small and not sta-
tistically diﬀerent from zero. So, there is no evidence that currency de-
nomination of the country’s debt is a signiﬁcant determinant of currency
risk. Finally, the last column of table 7.2 gauges whether trade imbalances
(deﬁned as the log of export to import values) add any signiﬁcant addi-
tional explanatory power to the regressions and help predict crash events.
The estimates show that this does not seem the case, likely reﬂecting the
fact that such imbalances are already captured by the other covariates in
the model.
In short, the preceding econometric results indicate that ﬂuctuations in
international capital ﬂows are signiﬁcant determinants of currency risk.
Accordingly, it is not surprising that SSs tend to be associated with cur-
rency crashes. Further, since SSs are often preceded by interest rate hikes
in core countries, it thus appears that ﬁnancial developments exogenous to
net capital-importing countries are at the root of currency crises. Yet, this
econometric evidence also indicates that this is not the full story: since not
all countries respond similarly to those external shocks, country-speciﬁc
factors do matter—notably the growth of money supply, the cyclicality of
ﬁscal balances, and variations in the international reserve coverage of the
domestic money stock. Each of these factors is discussed next.
7.4 Domestic Financial Imperfections and Procyclical Behavior
Two broad generalizations seem to command wide consensus in the his-
torical literature on the ﬁnancial markets of countries that witnessed cur-
rency crashes before WWI.22One is that their ﬁnancial markets were much
shallower relative not only to the so-called European core (Britain, France,
and Germany) but also relative to other emerging economies of the Anglo-
Saxon world and Scandinavia. This can be unambiguously gauged by a
broad range of ﬁnancial development indicators such as the number of
banks and bank capitalization per capita, or the ratios of broad money and
domestic bank credit to GDP. In addition, banks in these economies were
deemed to be poorly regulated, and information about borrowers’ credit
history usually hard to obtain. While these imperfections were in some
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22. See, for instance, della Paolera and Taylor (2001) on Argentina; Goldsmith (1986),
Haber (1997), and Trimer (2000) on Brazil; Llona Rodriguez (1990) on Chile; Fratianni and
Spinelli (1997, children. 3) on Italy.cases mitigated by stringent controls restricting entry (as in Brazil, for in-
stance), such regulations appear to have greatly hindered eﬃciency—a
point stressed in Cameron’s classic comparative study on early banking
(Cameron 1972). To these structural features, one added ingredient in
those economies was the existence of multiple issuing banks and the lack
of a national bank holding the monopoly of ﬁduciary money and soundly
performing the role of a lender of last resort.23
Some salient implications follow. First, shallower domestic bond mar-
kets and limited access to bank credit by ﬁrms imply that borrowers were
typically credit constrained; hence, any outward shift in the external
supply of funds would tend to automatically translate into faster credit
growth. Second, once information about creditworthiness is hard to ob-
tain, lending becomes more responsive to current collateral values pledged
against loans. Third, illiquid domestic markets would make it harder for
banks to borrow from the local private sector or sell to others the illiquid
(but otherwise solvent) items in their portfolios during monetary crunches,
exacerbating the risk of ﬁre sales and bank runs in the wake of SSs and
business cycle downturns. Finally, the decentralization of note issuing
rights combined with deﬁcient regulations and governments that were de-
pendent on banks to ﬁnance large deﬁcits tended to exacerbate moral haz-
ard and thus undermine the practice of backing of outstanding bank notes
with safe levels of specie holdings. This was likely to heighten the depress-
ing eﬀects of money creation on the exchange rate.
Figure 7.7 shows that countries that experienced currency crashes were
indeed the ones that embarked upon rapid monetary expansion, which far
exceeded domestic income during cyclical upswings. Argentina is the most
notable case, with the ratio of M2 to GDP rising from 28 to 65 percent of
GDP between 1880–89, even though real GDP itself nearly tripled during
the same period. The ﬂip side of such a rapid monetary expansion was a
sharp drop in the international reserve coverage of the domestic currency
in the later stages of the boom, which left banks highly vulnerable to a run
when capital ﬂows dried up in the run-up to the Baring’s crisis of 1890–91.
Likewise in Brazil, where monetary expansion had been previously curbed
by stringent regulations on bank entry, the sudden stop of 1890–91 was
preceded by unprecedented monetary expansion resulting from the sud-
den lift of controls on bank issuance (the Encilhamento), leading to a
twofold increase in the broad money to GDP ratio between 1889 and
1891.
Data for other countries is likewise suggestive of the signiﬁcant role of
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23. This seems to have been an important distinguishing feature of successful ﬁnancial de-
velopment in northern Europe. On the less well known but interesting experience of countries
other than the European core and the United States, see the key role played by the National-
banken in Denmark, the Nederlandsche Bank in the Netherlands, and the Riksbank in Swe-
den which are discussed in Hansen (1991), Jonker (1997), and Jonung (1984), respectively.monetary expansion in brewing currency crashes during SSs. In Chile, Por-
tugal, and to a lesser degree Spain, the elasticity of broad money to income
rose well above unity in the two to three years prior to the 1890–1892
crashes. This contrasts with the smoother behavior of money supply in
other countries, which either managed to stick to the peg or that experi-
enced a relatively mild depreciation, such as Italy and Russia in the early
1890s. Figure 7.8 corroborates the view that a high procyclicality of do-
mestic bank credit, as proxied by the M2 multiplier, contributed to cur-
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Fig. 7.7 Monetary and ﬁscal indicators in currency crisis countries (currency
crashes in shaded areas)
Source: See appendix A.rency crashes:24 as with the ratio of broad money to GDP, the money mul-
tiplier is noticeably more cyclical in crisis countries than in noncrisis ones.
The other distinguishing feature of countries in which SSs were followed
by currency crashes pertains to ﬁscal behavior. Gauged by either the ratio
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Fig. 7.7 (cont.)
24. The focus on M2 rather than on domestic bank credit is motivated by two considera-
tions. One is that theoretical models of nominal exchange rate determination (including the
one outlined in appendix 1) commonly postulate a direct link between monetary expansion
and the exchange rate. The other is the lack of data on domestic bank credit for several coun-
tries. An alternative indicator considered was to derive aggregate bank credit by the diﬀerence
between broad money and international reserves of the consolidated banking system, using
available data on the two variables. This yields a very similar pattern as that of M2.of public expenditure to revenues or the ratio of public debt to GDP aver-
aged by country over the entire period, it appears that ﬁscal behavior was
generally more relaxed in currency-crash countries. The upper panel of
ﬁgure 7.9 shows that three of the countries that experienced the worst
currency crashes in the pre-WWI era (Argentina, Chile, Greece) were pre-
cisely the ones with the highest average ratios of public expenditures to
revenues, whereas countries that managed to stick to gold throughout
tended to display lower ratios. Clearly there were exceptions, such as Brazil
(which experienced large currency drops without strikingly high ﬁscal im-
balances on average), and the association is certainly not one-to-one for all
countries (Australia and New Zealand being two other obvious outliers).
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Fig. 7.8 The M2 multiplier
Source: See appendix B.Overall, the ratio of expenditure to revenues in the currency-crash group
was around 10 percent higher than that for the noncrash group. The lower
panel of ﬁgure 7.9 further reinforces this point: not only did six of the eight
noncrash countries lie at the bottom of the debt to GDP distribution over
the entire period, but also the average ratio of debt to GDP was twice as
high among crash countries (85 percent) than among noncrash ones (38
percent).
No less importantly, such period averages obscure the fact that ﬁscal be-
havior was more procyclical in currency-crash countries. While there are
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Fig. 7.9 Fiscal indicators: Country averages over 1870–1913
Source: See appendix B.diﬀerent metrics to gauge the degree of ﬁscal procyclicality across coun-
tries (see, e.g., Bayoumi and Eichengreen 1995; Gavin and Perrotti 1997),
one measure that mitigates endogeneity issues is that of regressing the
cyclical component of real government expenditure on the cyclical com-
ponent of real GDP and/or foreign capital inﬂows. As discussed in Kamin-
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Table 7.3 OLS regression measures of ﬁscal procyclicality
Output gapt (1) Output gapt–1 (2) Kinﬂow gapt (3) Kinﬂow gapt–1 (4)
Argentina 1.138 1.127 0.037 0.089
(4.46)∗∗∗ (4.33)∗∗∗ (0.60) (1.15)
Brazil 0.943 0.903 0.157 0.155
(6.11)∗∗∗ (5.28)∗∗∗ (2.85)∗∗∗ (2.69)∗∗∗
Chile 1.938 1.807 0.323 0.248
(3.55)∗∗∗ (3.21)∗∗∗ (4.02)∗∗∗ (2.76)∗∗∗
Greece 2.284 1.930 0.050 –0.029
(5.17)∗∗∗ (3.97)∗∗∗ (0.39) (–0.22)
Italy –0.039 –0.118 0.057 0.073
(–0.14) (–0.41) (1.67)∗ (2.08)∗∗
Portugal 1.097 1.090 0.030 0.047
(9.49)∗∗∗ (8.54)∗∗∗ (0.82) (1.26)
Spain 0.130 0.316 –0.018 –0.018
(0.62) (1.54) (–0.71) (–0.69)
Russia 0.369 1.023 –0.110 –0.110
(0.98) (3.06)∗∗∗ (–1.96)∗∗ (–1.89)∗
Australia 1.249 1.299 –0.093 –0.060
(6.68)∗∗∗ (7.30)∗∗∗ (–1.47) (–0.91)
Canada 1.026 1.236 0.177 0.169
(4.21)∗∗∗ (5.30)∗∗ (2.72)∗ (2.51)∗∗
Denmark 0.669 0.933 0.044 0.113
(1.16) (1.60) (0.84) (2.18)
Finland 0.235 0.227 0.054 0.039
(0.27) (0.27) (0.59)∗∗∗ (0.41)
New Zealand 1.571 1.687 0.052 –0.006
(5.34)∗∗∗ (6.60)∗∗∗ (0.75) (–0.09)
Norway 0.005 1.035 –0.241 –0.230
(0.01) (1.48)∗∗∗ (–5.63)∗∗∗ (–5.10)∗∗∗
Sweden –0.043 0.098 0.040 0.034
(–0.18) (0.39) (1.64)∗ (1.33)
United States –0.644 –0.853 –0.027 –0.050
(–1.80)∗ (–2.54)∗∗ (–0.62) (–1.17)
Mean
Crash countries 0.982 1.010 0.066 0.057
Noncrash countries 0.508 0.708 0.001 0.001
Note: Dependent variable: Real government expenditure cycle.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.sky, Reinhart, and Végh (2004), this is because tax revenues are themselves
a direct function of the real GDP cycle—a relationship that is bound to be
strong among emerging markets, where tax bases are highly procyclical.
This is especially the case during the period under consideration, where
import and consumption taxes account for over 80 to 90 percent of tax rev-
enues in most countries comprising our sample (see Bordo and Cortes-
Conde 2001 as well as Sokoloﬀ and Zolt’s paper in this volume).
The ﬁrst column of table 7.3 reports the estimated coeﬃcients of a re-
gression of the cyclical component of real government expenditure (as be-
fore, measured as deviations from a log linear trend) on the cyclical com-
ponents of real GDP (also deﬁned as deviations from a log linear trend).
While such a regression potentially suﬀers from well-known biases associ-
ated with the use of generated regressors (a downward bias) as well as the
potential omission of other explanatory variables (a bias that can go either
direction), it is still valuable for the task at hand, which is to highlight cross-
country diﬀerences in ﬁscal reactions to the business cycle. The bivariate
regression estimates in the ﬁrst column of table 7.3 suggest that ﬁscal pol-
icy was highly procyclical in the countries that experienced the worst cur-
rency crashes during the period (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Greece, and Por-
tugal). While there is evidence that the ﬁscal stance was also procyclical in
three other countries that stuck to gold throughout (Australia, Canada,
and New Zealand), averages over crash and noncrash groups indicate that
the former was about twice more procyclical than the latter (0.98 versus
0.51). A similar inference about the higher ﬁscal procyclicality of the ﬁrst
group of countries also follows when using the one-year lagged instead of
current real GDP cycle, as reported in the second column of table 7.3.
In assessing the procyclicality of ﬁscal policies during this period of free
capital mobility, it is also of interest to gauge the extent to which real gov-
ernment expenditure responded to the international cycle in capital ﬂows.
More procyclical policy stances should be also associated with a higher
elasticity of spending to the supply of external ﬁnance. As before, I proxy
the latter as the total net capital outﬂows from the three main capital ex-
ports of the late nineteenth century (Britain, France, and Germany), all de-
nominated in sterling (or gold) and measured in terms of deviations from
a log-linear trend. The results are reported in columns (3) and (4) in table
7.3. Regardless of whether one uses current or one-year lagged values of
the explanatory variable, the group averages reported at the bottom of the
table suggest that crash countries tended to display a more responsive ﬁs-
cal behavior to the push of international capital ﬂows. While the estimated
coeﬃcients are not as large nor as statistically signiﬁcant as before, these
regressions again suggest that currency crash countries tended to be more
procyclical overall.
Such procyclicality tended to heighten currency risk by inducing loom-
ing ﬁscal imbalances during cyclical upswings. This can be seen in ﬁgure
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ratio of public expenditure to revenues) between currency crash events and
noncrash ones. Noting that t   0 corresponds to the year immediately be-
fore the downturn in capital inﬂows, it is apparent that ﬁscal imbalances
rose and were much larger, on average, in the subset of countries in which
SSs were accompanied by currency crashes. Likewise, the during- and
post-shock contrast is no less striking: while the ﬁscal stance appears to be
notably contractionary and hence procyclical among crash countries, non-
crash countries engaged in a mildly expansionary—and hence, counter-
cyclical—ﬁscal behavior. By imparting a further impulse to absorption
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Fig. 7.10 Fiscal and reserve positions around sudden stops
Source: See appendix A.during cyclical upswings, ﬁscal procyclicality tends to exacerbate imbal-
ances, which in turn will call for a real exchange rate depreciation and/or a
suﬃciently large drop in absorption. Given the more limited reserve cover-
age of the monetary base in those countries as well as the presence of non-
trivial nominal rigidities even in that earlier period (as discussed in Catão
and Solomou 2005), the nominal exchange rate would emerge as a natural
candidate to shoulder the burden of the adjustment. Thus, one would thus
expect this ﬁscal expenditure-to-revenue imbalance (G/T gap) to be a sig-
niﬁcant predictor of currency crashes, and this is precisely what the probit
results of table 7.2 show to be the case.
Finally, there is the channel related to the coverage of paper money in
circulation (Mo) with hard-currency reserves (mostly gold at the time).
The bottom panel of ﬁgure 7.10 indicates that, on average, noncrash coun-
tries entered the capital inﬂow cycle with twice as high reserve coverage
than their crash-prone counterparts. While the standard error bands are
strikingly large for noncrash (reﬂecting the ratios of bank gold reserves to
paper money above 200 percent in the large gold-producing economies of
Australia and New Zealand), median comparisons that play down such
outliers tell a similar story (25 percent versus 56 percent in the year just be-
fore the SS). So, the noncrash countries clearly counted on a much larger
reserve cushion against the capital account outﬂow. In addition, the be-
havior of the reserve coverage ratio during SS events in the noncrash coun-
tries suggest that their respective monetary authorities appear to have
played more closely by the so-called “rules of the game”: absolute reserve
losses were accompanied by a roughly concomitant drop in currency in cir-
culation, so that the reserve coverage ratio of Mo remained about stable on
average. By contrast, countries with initially lower reserve coverages, and
that also missed the opportunity of the boom in capital inﬂows to prop up
their coverage ratios, saw the latter drop by nearly one half (from 38 to 17
percent) between the year preceding the capital inﬂow peak (t   –1) and
the second year after the SS (t   3). To the extent that reserve accumula-
tion is inversely related to ﬁscal and domestic credit expansion as in ﬁrst-
generation currency crisis models a la Krugman (1979), the procyclicality
of the domestic ﬁscal and monetary stances shows up again as a key cul-
prit.
7.5 Conclusion
As with the post-Bretton Woods era, international capital ﬂows in the
pre-World War I world were anything but smooth. This paper has shown
that all net capital-importing countries for which the relevant annual data
exist experienced sporadic but often large and abrupt reversals in foreign
capital inﬂows. These sudden stops hit countries with widely disparate per
capita GDPs, levels of ﬁnancial development, and exchange rate regimes,
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mestic currencies. This suggests that none of these factors can prevent a
capital importer from being hit by a large capital account reversal—even
though deeper ﬁnancial markets, exchange rate ﬂexibility, and high levels
of precautionary reserves should help mitigate the associated side-eﬀects
on economic activity, as the recent literature on SSs indicates (Calvo,
Izquierdo, and Mejia 2004; Edwards 2004).
The dataset assembled in this paper also allows us to highlight other
striking parallels between SSs now and SSs then. One is the large magni-
tude of drops in net foreign capital inﬂows during these episodes, with a
median of about 5 percent of GDP (measured peak-to-trough) on a vari-
ous cross-country basis. The other is the relatively lengthy period it takes
for capital inﬂows to fully recover (four years on average). A third similar-
ity is the time bunching of such events. We have seen earlier that sudden
stops bunched around the early to mid-1870s, the early 1890s, and 1906–
1907. As is well known from the late nineteenth century and early twenti-
eth century economic historiography, all these subperiods were character-
ized by ﬁnancial crises and a higher incidence of sovereign defaults
(Kindleberger 1978; Lindert and Morton 1989; Kelly 1998; Eichengreen
2003). While in principle these SSs could have been triggered by country-
speciﬁc factors in capital importers (such as the U.S. railways bankruptcies
of 1873 or Argentina’s mortgage bond repayment crisis of early 1890),
which then irradiated to other emerging markets, possibly via mechanisms
highlighted in the international ﬁnancial contagion literature (Eichen-
green, Rose, and Wyzploz 1996), the evidence provided in this paper points
to one common factor in all these events—preceding hikes in central bank
discount rates in the core capital exporting countries, typically with a one-
to two-year lag. Once again, this has striking parallels with the post-1970
evidence, in that changes in U.S. interest rates appear to be a main driver
of capital ﬂows to developing countries (Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart
1993; Fernandez-Arias 1996) and of shifts in overall emerging market risk
(Catão and Kapur 2006). This obviously does not imply that domestic or
regional factors (including wars and other political conﬂicts) have been
unimportant during the period in some countries, but simply that mone-
tary tightening in the core of the world economy played a signiﬁcant role,
sometimes reinforcing those country-speciﬁc eﬀects.
Against this background, a main question addressed in this chapter is
why such SSs led to currency crashes in some countries but not in others.
Consistent with the evidence just discussed, the probit regression results of
section 7.3 indicate that SSs in capital exports from core countries to the rest
of the world, together with lagged international interest rates, did raise the
likelihood of currency crises generally, all else constant. But the same re-
gressions also show that country-speciﬁc factors related to money growth,
reserve coverage of domestic currency, and ﬁscal imbalances played a no
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to cyclical conditions and grew well in excess of aggregate income and
international reserves during upswings were the ones in which the worst
currency drops followed. Unsurprisingly, these are countries for which his-
torical literature ﬁnds the strongest evidence of a prevalence of loose
regulations on banks of issues, institutional obstacles to loan recovery, and
high credit elasticity to cyclically sensitive collateral values. Conversely,
economies with seemingly better-regulated banks and deeper ﬁnancial mar-
kets typically had a smoother broad money multiplier and also managed to
maintain a consistently higher backing of domestic bank liabilities or paper
money with international (gold) reserves; they were the ones that managed
to overcome the SS shock while sticking to their currency pegs. This evi-
dence brings back to the fore Whale’s (1937) and Ford’s (1962) earlier
views—grounded on a much slimmer data set and limited econometric ap-
paratus—on the importance of the domestic ﬁnancial imperfections in
propagating capital account shocks and accounting for cross-country dif-
ferences in macroeconomic adjustment during the classic gold standard era.
Similar considerations apply to the role of ﬁscal policy in aﬀecting cur-
rency risk. Countries where ﬁscal deﬁcits were higher on average and real
government spending more procyclical typically witnessed a juxtaposition
of SSs and currency drops. The channels through which ﬁscal imbalances
aﬀect the exchange rate are well known from currency crisis literature and,
as discussed previously, the probit results are broadly consistent with the
prediction of ﬁrst-generation currency crisis models (Krugman 1979)
about the role of ﬁscal deﬁcits in currency crashes: countries where gov-
ernment expenditures typically grew signiﬁcantly faster than the tax base
during upswings experienced reserve losses and large real exchange rate
appreciations that called for sharp correction when capital inﬂow suddenly
dried up. As discussed in Catão and Solomou (2005), nonnegligible nomi-
nal rigidities, combined with limits to the necessary decline in absorption
and a low elasticity of capital ﬂows to domestic interest rates, implied that
the nominal exchange rate would bear much of the burden of adjustment
in these cases.
What implications or lessons can be drawn from this evidence? A ﬁrst
lesson is that history often repeats itself, and that the documented patterns
of SSs over the past two decades have some striking similarities with those
in the past. Thus, they can be regarded as stylized facts about SSs more
broadly, and indicate that high capital mobility need not automatically
translate into stabilizing cross-border ﬁnancial ﬂows and greater con-
sumption smoothing. Then, as now, individual countries’ capacity to reap
beneﬁts and minimize the risk of capital mobility to degenerate into dis-
ruptive currency crashes and competitive devaluations lie most critically
on ﬁscal and monetary management and the resilience of countries’
domestic banking systems. Those in which the monetary transmission
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kind of voracity eﬀects discussed in Tornell and Lane (1998) or other po-
litical imperfections (Végh and Talvi 2000) that discourage both public
saving and reserve accumulation during good times—are more likely to
face greater exchange rate instability and disruptive currency drops as a re-
sult.
Two other salient policy implications should also be brieﬂy mentioned.
Time bunching in SSs implies that country insurance type of contracts are
likely to be more eﬀective, if not only feasible, when drawn between net
capital exporters and net capital importing countries, since the latter tend
to be badly hit at about the same time, thus limiting the scope for risk shar-
ing among them. Last but not least, to the extent that SSs take place in the
wake of monetary tightening in core advanced countries, this suggests that
a high international reserve coverage of domestic monetary liabilities when
world interest rates start creeping up is an important ingredient in mini-
mizing the risk of abrupt and often contractionary currency drops. This
underscores the importance of precautionary reserve accumulation at the
earlier upswing stage of the international investment cycle.
Appendix A
A Benchmark Model of Nominal 
Exchange Rate Determination
This appendix brieﬂy outlines a benchmark model of nominal exchange
rate determination that guides the empirical analysis of currency crashes
provided in the main text. The model assumes that prices are sticky in the
short run and that risk-adjusted uncovered interest parity (UIP) holds, so
that the expected change in the log of spot exchange rate ( ee
t 1) responds
to the nominal short-term interest rate diﬀerential between onshore (it)
and oﬀshore (it ∗) asset markets, adjusted by a time-varying country risk
premium ( t):
(2)  ee
t 1   it ∗   it      t
where positive values for  et 1denote an appreciation between tand t 1,
and 0    1.25 Thus, when the country risk premium rises (or equiva-
lently, foreign ﬁnance supply drops), and in the absence of arbitrage fail-
ures, a ﬁxed exchange ( et 1   0) can only be expected if the short-run
domestic interest rate rises relative to the foreign rate. Otherwise, the
exchange rate would overshoot at time t, depreciating beyond its long-run
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25. The risk premium is thus being broadly deﬁned to include bank failure or any conﬁsca-
tion risk that aﬀects the representative asset holding.equilibrium (to be deﬁned in the following); only in this case could the
home country investor be compensated for the rise in country risk by an ex-
pected currency appreciation between t and t   1. By the same asset mar-
ket equilibrium condition, the only way that a rise in the foreign interest
rate would be compatible with a ﬁxed exchange rate under unchanged do-
mestic interest rates is if the country risk premium drops: only in this case
would equilibrium be maintained without entailing an expected exchange
rate change.
In the long run, the exchange rate has to converge to a level that is con-
sistent with good market equilibrium. As is standard in the literature,
sticky prices imply that the adjustment process is expected to eliminate
diﬀerences between actual and equilibrium exchange rate levels gradually:
(3)  ee
t 1      (et   e  t)   E( e  )t.
where e  is the log of the long-run equilibrium nominal exchange rate, and
  characterizes the speed of adjustment, 0    1. This implied adjust-
ment dynamics can be shown to be consistent with rational expectations
under sticky prices (Frankel 1979).
Combining equations (2) and (3) yields:
(4) et   e  t   [(it   it ∗)   E( e  t)]    t.
Equation (4) postulates that at any given point in time the nominal ex-
change rate moves along its long-run equilibrium level, adjusted upward
(downward) by any positive (negative) short-term interest rate diﬀerential
between home and abroad, a decline (increase) in the country risk pre-
mium, and expected changes in the equilibrium nominal exchange rate.
The second pillar of the model hinges on what determines e  . In the long
run, PPP may not necessarily hold, so that the equilibrium real exchange
rate is possibly time varying:
(5) re  rt   e  t   p  t ∗   p   t
where pand p∗are the domestic and foreign price indices, respectively. Us-
ing the foreign price as the numeraire and since long-run world price inﬂa-
tion under a gold standard should be negligible, it follows that
(6)  re  rt    e  t    p  t.
Given long-run price ﬂexibility, the standard log-linear version of the
Keynes-Hicks money market equilibrium condition allows us to map long-
run domestic price inﬂation onto the behavior of money supply and out-
put aggregates, assuming a log-linear trend in secular velocity:







Sudden Stops and Currency Drops: A Historical Look 277where   is the inﬂation rate, y and m are the logs of the domestic real out-
put and money stock, respectively;   is the trend growth rate in money ve-
locity and   0.
Substituting equations (5), (6), and (7) into equation (4) yields
(8) et   e  t   [it   it ∗      t]   E( r  e  r   t)   ( m  t      y   t    ).
Equalizing long-run to actual values in money and output as is com-
monly done in empirical applications (see Frankel and Rose 1995), and
assuming that expected changes in the real exchange rate are directly
proportional to preceding deviations of terms of trade, international
productivity diﬀerentials, and ﬁscal positions from their respective long-
run trends, this yields
(9) et   e  t     ( mt      yt)    (tot   t  o  t  )t 1    (y  pc   y  ∗
pc)t 1
    
g
t
     
g  
t
  t 1   (it   it ∗)      t   εt,
where   – / .
The ﬁnal step is to characterize what determines the country risk pre-
mium  . As in Jeanne and Rose (2002), this is modeled as proportional to
the external inﬂow of liquidity. As discussed in the main text, such an eﬀect
is bound to be directly related to the push of capital exports from the core
advanced economies ( b∗) net the degree to which domestic authorities or
the banking system can oﬀset changes in capital inﬂows with changes in
the foreign exchange reserves to money ratio ( res). This yields the bench-
mark equation that guides the empirical analysis in the main text:
(10) et   e  t     ( mt    yt)    (tot   t  o  t  )t 1    (y  pc   y  ∗
pc)t 1
    
g
t
     
g  
t
  t 1   (it   it ∗)    ( b∗      res)t   εt
Appendix B
Data Construction and Sources
Argentina
Net foreign capital inﬂow: Obtained by the diﬀerence of changes in specie






















278 Luis A. V. Catãocount provided in della Paolera, Gerardo and Alan Taylor (2003, data
appendix).
Foreign trade and external terms of trade: see Catão and Solomou (2005,
appendix 2).
Gold reserves: 1870–1882: bank specie reserves from della Paolera (1992);
1883–1913: della Paolera (1988, 173, col. 3).
Central government expenditures and revenues: Mitchell (2003).
Central government debt: della Paolera and Taylor (2003).
Money: Money in circulation (Mo) from della Paolera (1992). Broad
money (M2) computed by splicing the Baiocco’s 1870–83 series with
that computed by Gerardo della Paolera, both of which reported in della
Paolera and Taylor (2003).
Exchange rate: della Paolera and Taylor (2003).
Domestic interest rate: average annual yields on domestic mortgage bonds
provided in della Paolera (1988).
Domestic price index: Catão and Solomou (2005).
GDP: della Paolera and Taylor (2003).
Population: Maddison (2003).
Brazil
Net foreign capital inﬂow: Franco (1988).
Foreign trade and external terms of trade: IBGE (1986).
Gold reserves: 1870–1900 from Franco (1988); extended through 1913
based on linear interpolation between 1900 and 1905 and using data
from Paulo Neuhaus, Rio de Janeiro.
Central government expenditures and revenues: IBGE (1986).
Central government debt: Foreign debt from IBGE. Domestic debt ob-
tained from Levy (1995), “The Brazilian Public Debt—Domestic and
Foreign, 1824–1913,” in The Public Debt in Latin America in Historical
Perspective, ed. Richard Liehr, 209–54. Frankfurt: Vervuert.
Money: Mo and M2 both from IBGE (1986).
Exchange rate: IBGE (1986).
Domestic interest rate:kindly provided by Summerhill and Triner, based on
primary data on domestic prices of 5 percent and 6 percent domestic
perpetual bonds (polices).
Domestic price index: see Catão and Solomou (2005).
GDP: Contador and Haddad 91975); 1900–13 from C. Haddad (1978).
Population: Maddison (2003).
Chile
Net foreign capital inﬂow: derived by diﬀerence between changes in specie
reserves in the banking system and the external current account balance
estimated in Braun et al. (2000).
Foreign trade and external terms of trade: Braun et al.
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Central government expenditures and revenues: Braun et al.
Central government debt: Braun et al.
Money: 1870–78: Mo based on outstanding bank notes from Llona Ro-
driguez (1990, tables 73 and 75), then spliced with the currency-in-
circulation series provided in Mitchell (1998). M2 adds total deposits to
these series using Llona Rodriguez’s estimates, provided in the same
source.
Exchange rate: Braun et al.
Domestic interest rate:short-term average loan interest rate charges by do-
mestic banks from Braun et al.
Domestic price index: see Catão and Solomou (2005).
GDP: Braun et al.
Population: Maddison (2003).
Greece
Net foreign capital inﬂow: not available.
Foreign trade and external terms of trade:Foreign trade data from Mitchell
(2001). Terms of trade series kindly furnished by Jeﬀrey Williamson.
Specie reserves: Lazaretou (1993).
Central government expenditures and revenues: Mitchell (2001).
Central government debt: Lazaretou (1993).
Money: Lazaretou (1993).
Exchange rate: Catão and Solomou (2005).
Domestic price index:GDP deﬂator, as provided in Kostelenos et al. (forth-
coming).
GDP: Kostelenos et al.
Population: Maddison (2003).
Italy
Net foreign capital inﬂow: Calculated as the diﬀerence between changes in
specie reserves in the banking system and the current account balance
reported in Tattara (2000).
Foreign trade and external terms of trade:Foreign trade data from Mitchell
(2001), International Historical Statistics: Europe, London. Terms of
trade series kindly furnished by Jeﬀrey Williamson.
Specie reserves: Fratianni and Spinelli (1984).
Central government expenditures and revenues: Mitchell (2001).
Central government debt: Zamagni (1998).
Money: Fratianni, Michele and Franco Spinelli.
Exchange rate: Catão and Solomou (2005).
Domestic price index: Maddison (1991).
GDP: ibid.
Population: Maddison (2003).
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Net foreign capital inﬂow: not available.
Foreign trade and external terms of trade:Lains (1995). The ﬁgures used are
based on the author’s revision of the respective oﬃcial series.
Specie reserves: Mata and Valério (1994).
Central government expenditures and revenues: Mitchell (2001).
Central government debt: Mata and Valério.
Money: Fratianni, Michele and Franco Spinelli.
Exchange rate: Catão and Solomou (2005).
Domestic price index: see Catão and Solomou (2005).
GDP: das Neves (1994).
Population: ibid.
Russia
Net foreign capital inﬂow: calculated as the diﬀerence between changes in
specie reserves in the banking system and the current account balance
reported in Gregory (1982).
Foreign trade and external terms of trade: export and import values from
Mitchell (2000). Terms of trade series kindly provided by Jeﬀrey Wil-
liamson.
Specie reserves: Flandreau and Zulmer (2004).
Central government expenditures and revenues: Mitchell (2001).
Central government debt: Flandreau and Zulmer (2004).
Money: Mo from Crisp (1976, 138–39). M2 adds Mo to bank deposits
taken from Mitchell (2001).
Exchange rate: Catão and Solomou (2005).
Domestic price index: see Catão and Solomou (2005).
GDP: in the absence of a GDP series, the net national product estimate
provided in Gregory (1982, table 3.1, 56–57), (variant 1) was used.
Spain
Net foreign capital inﬂow: unpublished estimates by Leandro Prados,
kindly provided by the author.
Foreign trade and external terms of trade: Prados de la Escosura (1988).
Specie reserves: Carreras and Tafunell (1988), and Aceña and Reis (2000).
Central government expenditures and revenues: Mitchell (2001).
Central government debt: Carreras and Tafunell (1988).
Money: Aceña.
Exchange rate: ibid.
Domestic price index: the deﬂator for private consumption from Prados de
la Escosura (2003).
GDP: Prados de la Escosura (2003, Table A.13.5, 681–82).
Population: ibid.
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Net foreign capital inﬂow: calculated as the diﬀerence between changes in
specie reserves in the banking system and the current account balance
underlying Jones and Obstfeld (2001). The database is available at: http://
www.nber.org/databases/jones-obstfeld. The Butlin series was chosen
for the estimates reported in this paper, since the new current account
estimates which completely exclude gold ﬂows yield surprisingly high
absolute levels of net capital inﬂows to GDP in the early 1890s. Both
series yield, however, similar inferences on the timing and magnitude
of changes in net capital inﬂows to GDP.
Foreign trade and external terms of trade: trade values from Mitchell
(2002). Terms of trade from Bordo and Rockoﬀ (1996).
Specie reserves: Obstfeld and Jones.
Central government expenditures and revenues: Mitchell.
Central government debt: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Money: Mitchell.
Exchange rate: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).




Net foreign capital inﬂow: calculated as the diﬀerence between changes in
specie reserves in the banking system and the current account balance
from Urquart and Buckley (1965).
Foreign trade and external terms of trade: trade values from Mitchell
(2002). Terms of trade from Urquart and Buckley.
Specie reserves: Obstfeld and Jones.
Central government expenditures and revenues: Mitchell.
Central government debt: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Money: Mitchell (2001).
Exchange rate: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).




Net foreign capital inﬂow: calculated as the diﬀerence between changes in
specie reserves in the banking system and the current account balance
underlying Jones and Obstfeld (2001). The database is available at: http://
www.nber.org/databases/jones-obstfeld.
Foreign trade and external terms of trade: trade values from Mitchell
(2002). Terms of trade from Andres Olgaard (1993).
Specie reserves: Obstfeld and Jones.
282 Luis A. V. CatãoCentral government expenditures and revenues: Mitchell.
Central government debt: Flandreau and Zulmer (2004).
Money: Mitchell.
Exchange rate: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Domestic price index: ibid.




Net foreign capital inﬂow: calculated as the diﬀerence between changes in
specie reserves in the banking system and the current account balance
underlying Jones and Maurice Obstfeld (2001). The database is available
at: http://www.nber.org/databases/jones-obstfeld.
Foreign trade and external terms of trade: trade values from Mitchell
(2001). Export and import prices, and terms of trade from Hjerppe
(1989, 259–60).
Specie reserves: Obstfeld and Jones.
Central government expenditures and revenues: Mitchell.
Central government debt: Flandreau and Zulmer (2004).
Money: Mitchell.
Exchange rate: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).




Net foreign capital inﬂow: not available.
Foreign trade and external terms of trade: Mitchell (2002). Terms of trade
kindly provided by Jeﬀrey Williamson.
Specie reserves:reserves (coins and bullions) in trading banks from Bloom-
ﬁeld (1984, table IX.1, 386–87).
Central government expenditures and revenues: Mitchell.
Central government debt: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Money: sum of currency in circulation from Mitchell and deposits in trad-
ing banks from Rankin (1992).
Exchange rate: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).




Net foreign capital inﬂow: calculated as the diﬀerence between changes in
specie reserves in the banking system and the current account balance
Sudden Stops and Currency Drops: A Historical Look 283underlying Jones and Obstfeld (2001). The database is available at: http://
www.nber.org/databases/jones-obstfeld.
Foreign trade and external terms of trade: trade values from Mitchell.
Terms of trade from Edison and Klovland (1988).
Specie reserves: Obstfeld and Jones.
Central government expenditures and revenues: Mitchell.
Central government debt: Flandreau and Zulmer (2004).
Money: Mitchell.
Exchange rate: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Domestic price index: Mitchell (2001).




Net foreign capital inﬂow: calculated as the diﬀerence between changes in
specie reserves in the banking system and the current account balance
underlying Jones and Obstfeld (2001). The database is available at: http://
www.nber.org/databases/jones-obstfeld.
Foreign trade and external terms of trade: trade values from Mitchell.
Terms of trade and foreign trade prices from Fridlizius (1963).
Specie reserves: Obstfeld and Jones.
Central government expenditures and revenues: Mitchell.
Central government debt: Flandreau and Zulmer (2004).
Money: Mitchell.
Exchange rate: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Domestic price index: Maddison (1995).




Net foreign capital inﬂow: calculated as the diﬀerence between changes in
specie reserves in the banking system and the current account balance
underlying Jones and Obstfeld.
Foreign trade and external terms of trade: trade values from Mitchell.
Terms of trade from Williamson (1964, table B4, 262).
Specie reserves: Obstfeld and Jones.
Central government expenditures and revenues: Mitchell.
Central government debt: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Money: Mitchell.
Exchange rate: Oﬃcer (2001).
Domestic price index: Balke and Gordon (1989).
GDP: Jones and Obstfeld.
Population: Maddison (2003).
284 Luis A. V. CatãoEuropean Core Countries
Central bank discount rates: Bank of England’s discount rate for Mitchell
(1988); Bank of France’s discount rate from Lévy-Leboyer and Bour-
guignon (1985); German discount rate from Homer and Sylla (1991).
Capital exports: U.K. data from Stone (1999); French data from Lévy-
Leboyer and Bourguignon (1985); German data from Bloomﬁeld
(1968).
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